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Abstract 
The declining contribution of EU manufacturing to total GDP and the simultaneous fall of its share in global 
manufacturing have led to concerns about an overall loss of EU competitiveness, in particular vis-à-vis China. 
We analyse the empirical evidence underpinning these concerns by applying a newly developed decomposition 
technique to global input-output data spanning the years 2000 to 2014. In this, we consider both the sectoral 
and final demand (or value chain) definition of manufacturing. We find, first, that manufacturing’s lower 
share in EU total value added has generally been exaggerated due to the use of nominal measures, noting 
that higher-tech manufacturing actually grew in real terms. Second, the decomposition analysis reveals that 
lower economic growth in the EU relative to the world had the strongest negative impact on the contribution 
of its manufacturing sector, while shifts in demand patterns exerted a negative (positive) impact for activities 
with lower (higher) technological content. And third, the observed loss of market shares confirms a downturn 
of EU manufacturing competitiveness, especially in textiles and electronics, with pharmaceuticals as the only 
industry showing resilience under external competition. 
JEL classification: F14, L16, L60 
Keywords: Deindustrialization, manufacturing, global value chains, competitiveness, industrial policy, value-
added trade. 
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1 Introduction 
Maintaining a competitive manufacturing sector is one of the priorities of the European Union's economic 
policy. Viewed as "key driver of productivity and innovation", the European Commission set a strategic target 
of rising the share of industry(1) in total GDP to 20% by 2020 – compared to around 15% in 2009 (European 
Commission 2012, 2014, 2017). Corroborating this objective was the call of EU heads of state – 2019 spring 
summit – for an "assertive industrial policy allowing the EU to remain an industrial power".(2)  
The concern of policymakers can be explained by a series of unsettling observations. In the EU, the nominal 
share of manufacturing in total GDP (its 'weight') declined at an average rate of 0.25 percentage points per 
year between 2000 and 2014. Whereas the EU represented 26% of the world's total manufacturing in 2000, 
this figure fell to 21% in 2014. At the same time, the share of China jumped from 7% to 25%.(3) Here, 
beyond the mere concern about losing weight against a catching-up giant economy, the EU worries about a 
loss of capacity and leadership in key technologies of the future (JRC 2019, p.9-11). Following this trend, 
manufacturing jobs – valued as well-paid blue collar jobs (Veugelers 2013, p.20) – dropped in the EU from 38 
to 32 million people between 2000 and 2014.(4)  
To some extent, these developments reflect the increased fragmentation of global value chains. Information 
technology, global logistics, and low trade barriers have enabled the unbundling of different production stages 
(e.g. development, production, distribution). As a consequence, a range of economic activities – in particular 
those characterized by higher labour intensity – relocated to low wage countries ('offshoring'). Empirical 
evidence confirms the increasing use of foreign sourced inputs in the EU and the presence of foreign value 
added in its exports (e.g. De Backer et al. 2013). 
However, at such aggregate level these observations constitute more than else anecdotal evidence, and 
hardly justify conclusions on the real 'state of health' of EU manufacturing, e.g. whether it has experienced a 
loss of competitiveness that would warrant public policy intervention. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is 
to provide an in-depth study of the evolution of EU manufacturing and its specific sectors, both relative to the 
non-manufacturing part of the EU economy and also vis-a-vis the manufacturing sectors of its main 
competitors. 
By doing so we expand the study of Timmer et al. (2013) to more recent years (they mostly stop at 2008) 
and address the question they were discussing but not analysing formally: is the declining share of the EU's 
manufacturing a 'natural consequence' of structural change in final demand, i.e. its sectoral and geographical 
composition? Timmer et al. (2013) claim that the decline is mainly the consequence of a lower presence of EU 
value-added in each category of manufacturing final demand (see their footnote 7), but do not provide 
further evidence on this point. 
Our contribution does exactly this, by developing an analytical decomposition technique and applying it to 
nominal and real-terms global input-output data (WIOD) spanning the years 2000 to 2014. We first quantify 
how the EU manufacturing's weight has changed over the considered period and then attribute these changes 
to different types of underlying trends in global value chains. In doing so we reveal a number of economy-
wide patterns, but also the considerable idiosyncrasy found at the sector level, which prompts the need to re-
assess our view on manufacturing and to interpret the afore-mentioned stylized facts more cautiously. 
In technical terms, the main innovation of our decomposition approach (derived in Section 3) is its ability to 
disentangle four different drivers of changes in value-added shares: two types of demand effects – namely 
volume and composition of demand – and two types of value chain participation effects – namely sectoral 
participation and market shares. Whereas the demand components represent standard categories, the two 
participation components were conceived for this study and capture changes in the distribution of value 
added across sectors and countries generated by one unit of final demand of a given product. They can, thus, 
be associated with competitiveness. Lastly, another advantage of our decomposition is its generality, allowing 
us to apply the same formal framework both to the question of the weight of manufacturing within the EU's 
total economy and to the share of EU manufacturing in worldwide manufacturing. 
                                           
(1)  Here, "industry" is a broader term referring to manufacturing, extractive industries, and utilities. However, in value-added terms 
manufacturing dominates this group, accounting for more than 80%. Our analysis focuses on manufacturing as it is clearly defined 
and relatively more homogenous than the wider category of industry. 
(2)  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-1-2019-INIT/en/pdf  
(3)  More stylized facts on the recent evolution of EU manufacturing are presented in the second chapter of both Veugelers (2013) and 
(2017). 
(4)  Also, the financial crisis 2008-12 was viewed as a demonstration of why excessive reliance on the financial sector should be 
avoided (Veugelers 2013, p.1), epitomized by the quick recovery of Germany, which maintains a larger manufacturing share than 
the other large EU members. 
 3 
When defining the value-added contribution of manufacturing, let us note that two equally defensible 
approaches exist: (i) sector-based, which consists of summing up all value-added generated in the EU 
manufacturing sectors (i.e. motor vehicle sector, chemical sector, etc.), and (ii) demand-based, which means 
summing up all value-added embodied in manufacturing final products (cars, household appliances, medicine 
etc.), i.e. all value-added that is generated in the production of manufactured final goods.(5) The second 
definition typically includes a substantial amount of value-added from service sectors, given that service 
inputs (e.g. legal services, design, distribution services, etc.) are widely used in the production of manufactured 
goods. 
In our contribution, we will consider and compare both sides: the more conventional sector-based measure of 
manufacturing value-added, as well as the final demand perspective.(6) Based on this, we provide a detailed 
analysis of the decline of the EU's manufacturing share from four different angles: (i) sector-based against 
the EU's total value-added, (ii) sector-based against worldwide manufacturing value-added, (iii) final-demand-
based against the EU's total value-added and (iv) final-demand-based against worldwide manufacturing 
value-added. In this, we focus on the real economy, using chain-linked data expressing volumes relative to 
year 2010. However, an initial investigation based on nominal data is carried out to highlight the for some 
sectors important role of price dynamics, especially when analysing the decline of the manufacturing within 
the EU's total economy. 
Regarding our main empirical findings, the analysis of the EU's domestic manufacturing share first of all 
shows that the seemingly dramatic decline (from 18.7% to 15.3%) has to be put into perspective, given that 
price dynamics – the decline of prices for manufactured goods relative to service goods – account for more 
than two thirds of the observed overall downturn. In fact, the aggregate value-added share of the seven 
manufacturing sectors with higher technological content has actually increased in real terms (especially 
pharma, electronics and motor vehicles). Second, we find that a combination of various factors is responsible 
for the remaining (real terms) 1.1 percentage points decline: the structural shift in the consumption basket 
away from manufacturing demand at the EU domestic level, the EU's loss of market shares in textiles and 
electronics, and, finally, technological change reducing the use of EU manufacturing inputs. 
On the other side, the decline of the EU's global share in total manufacturing value-added (from 30% to 21%) 
is found to be by more than 60% attributable to demand effects, reflecting the fallen weight of the EU 
economy in the world and the shrinking share of manufacturing in total domestic demand. However, an 
important finding is that nearly 40% of the EU's decline is associated with the competitiveness dimension: the 
EU's loss of market shares in final and intermediate product markets and technological change that moved 
away from products with higher presence of EU manufacturing value-added are shown to have contributed 
about equally to the reduced participation of EU manufacturing value-added in global value chains. 
Turning to the final-demand perspective (or GVC income), we first show that the share of the EU economy 
contributing to manufacturing value chains is about 4 percentage points higher than the share of value-added 
represented by manufacturing sectors themselves. However, it still follows the same weakly declining trend 
observed under the sectoral perspective (-1.4 percentage points decline vs. -1.1). Also the factors explaining 
this trend do not notably differ from those identified in the sectoral view analysis; with the only exception that 
the negative effect from technological change becomes negligible, which is a consequence of the final 
demand perspective's more neutral view with regard to sectoral changes in the input structure, at least as 
long as new inputs have the same amount of EU added-value as those used before. 
With respect to the EU's global manufacturing share, its decline is slightly less pronounced from the 
perspective of final demand, pointing to the stabilizing role of service contributions to global manufacturing. 
Still, both perspectives robustly confirm the key finding that the EU's downturn is significantly larger than that 
of either US or Japan, whereas China experienced a spectacular increase of its global share. The larger decline 
of the EU than that of its competitors is explained by a stronger negative impact of demand effects, which for 
the EU account for more than 70% of the total effect. Consistently bucking the negative trend is the EU 
pharmaceutical industry, which slightly increased its global value-added share, under both perspectives. 
Finally, in a short extension we analyse two complimentary aspects: The EU's relative specialization within 
global manufacturing value chains and the associated employment. The former provides evidence on how the 
EU has moved from being a provider of manufacturing value-added – especially of higher tech manufacturing 
– towards being a contributor to manufacturing by means of value-added from business and other service 
                                           
(5)  This was first proposed, as far as we can see, by Timmer et al. (2013) under the name of GVC income. 
(6)  While we generally subscribe to the arguments in favour of the final demand perspective made by Timmer et al. (2013) and 
Miroudot (2019) for the question of cross-country competiveness analysis, for the study of the manufacturing share in a given 
economy's GDP it is also useful to adopt the sectoral value-added perspective. 
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activities (e.g. health, public administration). The latter confirms the structural change at the level of 
employment – in 2014 less than 50% of the total EU employment linked to manufacturing value chains is 
found in manufacturing sectors – and also the simultaneous strong losses of employment in manufacturing 
sectors (–5.5 mn over 2000 to 2014) and lighter gains in business services (+1.3 mn). Our decomposition 
framework is then applied to show that both the EU's diminishing specialization on manufacturing and the 
loss of employment in manufacturing sectors are driven mainly by demand factors and technological change, 
and to a lesser extent by a loss of competitiveness. 
In terms of the policy implications, we argue that the generally gloomy view on EU manufacturing needs to be 
more differentiated and partially revised when zooming in on particular sectors. While it is true that some 
low-tech manufacturing sectors like textiles have recorded substantial losses of competitiveness and, 
consequently, of value-added shares, others actually improved their competitive position. Our study illustrates 
how challenging it is to disentangle the simultaneous and sometimes countervailing impacts of demand, 
technology and competitiveness shifts, but the sectoral idiosyncrasies that we identify also demonstrate that 
a 'one size fits all' policy intervention lacking such detailed information would miss its target. 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on global trends for 
manufacturing activities and on measurement approaches to account for the relevance of this sector. It 
underlines similarities and differences with respect to our methodology, which is introduced in Section 3 
together with our data sources. Section 4 analyses the manufacturing share in the EU's total value-added, 
comparing the nominal and the price-adjusted measure. Section 5 delves deeper and quantifies the role of 
demand and participation effects for the observed changes in the EU manufacturing sector and individual 
activities, also in comparison with global competitors. This analysis is complemented in Section 6, where the 
final demand perspective is adopted to measure the sector's weight and characterize its evolution. Finally, 
Section 7 summarizes the main findings and discusses policy implications.  
 5 
2 Literature review 
The renewed attention of policy debates on the manufacturing sector is neither a European nor a very new 
phenomenon. Policy makers have for some time seen the manufacturing sector as an important driver of 
productivity growth, innovation, and export capacity (European Commission 2014). Indeed, manufacturing 
provides the largest part of private R&D investments, and manufactured goods dominate international trade 
(Veugelers, 2017, p.26).(7)   
In the US, amidst a surge of manufacturing offshoring during the 2000s, the potentially negative impacts 
from a shrinking manufacturing sector on national innovation capacities were discussed widely, see, e.g., 
Pisano and Shih (2012). Baily and Bosworth (2014) reviewed the evolution of US manufacturing over the last 
decades, to assess whether or not the US is undergoing a manufacturing crisis. They argue that the 
concurrent trends of a steadily falling employment share and a roughly constant output share (in terms of 
real value-added) actually represent a long-term stable behaviour and should not cause alarmism. 
However, their study also points to the fact that in recent years the stability of the US manufacturing share 
was only maintained due to the exceptional real output growth of nearly 20% annually in the computer and 
electronics sector, while the combined GDP share of the rest of manufacturing actually fell. They emphasize 
the strong dependency of the reported real manufacturing output on the deflator of these quickly evolving 
goods, calling for caution in view of the statistical uncertainties involved in adjusting nominal prices for 
quality improvements (e.g. when computer become faster and have larger memory).(8)  
Extending the geographical scope, Felipe and Mehta (2016) construct 64 country time series spanning from 
1970 to 2010, and show that the constancy – in real value-added terms – of the manufacturing share in total 
GDP also holds at the global aggregate level. Nevertheless, their data also puts into evidence how the weight 
of different world regions in total global manufacturing value-added has changed. The 'Europe and Central 
Asia' region, in particular, dropped from representing around 37% to around 20% of global manufacturing 
value-added. 
Another strand of research on the state of manufacturing in industrialized countries starts with the 
conceptual question of what should be counted as manufacturing: is it really justified to limit the analysis of 
manufacturing to the value-added (and employment) of the manufacturing sectors themselves, or – in view 
of today's fragmented value chains – shouldn't upstream service (and other) inputs also be included?(9) The 
seminal work in this area, Timmer et al. (2013), introduces the measure of "GVC (Global Value Chain) income" 
to account for the entire value chain of all manufactured goods in final demand. The authors advocate this as 
a better indicator of manufacturing competitiveness than gross exports, giving examples of how the latter can 
overestimate competitiveness and lead to incorrect conclusions on countries' revealed comparative 
advantage. 
In their contribution, Timmer et al. (2013) derive how the GVC income can be formally computed from global 
input-output data. Using the WIOD database, the measure is then used to study the manufacturing 
competitiveness of the EU and its member states during the period of 1995 to 2011. At the aggregate level, 
the EU's share in global manufacturing GVC income has declined from 32% in 1995 to 24% in 2011, quite 
similar to the finding of Felipe and Mehta (2016) for the more narrowly defined manufacturing sector share. 
Timmer et al. (2013) rule out the possibility that this decline simply reflects a 'natural' structural change 
triggered by relatively lower demand for manufactured goods when income in the EU rises, arguing that the 
domestic bias for manufactured goods is relatively weak and that therefore the shift of global manufacturing 
demand towards emerging economies like China should not be an obstacle for the generation of value-added 
in EU industries. They also exclude an impact from shifts in the sectoral composition of manufacturing 
demand (e.g. from cars towards electronics), and thus conclude that the decline of the EU's share "is due to 
losses in its value added share in each product GVC", i.e. an overall reduction of EU value-added embodied in 
final manufacturing products. 
This central finding is interpreted as a loss of EU competitiveness, and as main culprit the analysis points to 
the EU's insufficient participation in the value chains of growing non-EU manufacturing demand. Further 
corroborating this is a decomposition analysis that quantifies which part of the absolute increase of EU 
                                           
(7)  A more critical review of the expected benefits from a higher manufacturing share is Coad et al. (2019). 
(8)  The singular role of this particular sector for the analysis of aggregate manufacturing, and the relevance of the price deflator is also 
discussed – with an update to more recent data – by Schmalensee (2018). 
(9)  Changes in the official classification system leading to some manufacturing activities becoming recorded as service activities–as 
happened with wholesale and retail trade in the US–can also have a relevant impact on what is reported as the weight of 
manufacturing, especially for employment (Fort and Klimek, 2016). 
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manufacturing GVC income stems from increased global demand and which part from changes in (EU and 
non-EU) production structures, finding that demand growth was the dominating driver of increased GVC 
income in the EU. 
However, this decomposition does not quantify the contributions of the different drivers to the observed 
decline of the EU's share in global manufacturing GVC income, which is one of the key results of our study. 
Moreover, in their definition of the demand driver all types of changes in the final demand vector are pooled 
together, including a shift from, say, EU produced chemicals to Japanese chemicals in US final demand. This 
deviates from most approaches, which differentiate changes in the geographical and sectoral composition of 
demand from changes in the specific demand for a product of a certain country. While the former represent 
compositional effects, the latter can be interpreted as a country-specific performance factor, as done, e.g., in 
the below discussed Cezar et al. (2017) and in our own approach. Finally, Timmer et al. (2013) also do not 
delve into the competitiveness of disaggregated manufacturing sectors, except for an analysis of revealed 
comparative advantage.(10) Providing evidence on the significant heterogeneity among sectors in terms of 
their GDP share and international competitiveness is another of the key contributions of our study. 
Cezar et al. (2017) also advocate the final-demand approach for cross-country studies of manufacturing 
competitiveness, backed-up by evidence of the increasing value-added contribution of services and foreign 
inputs in manufacturing products.(11) They compute the GVC income (calling it "value added for manufacturing 
final demand", or VAMFD) for eight large economies, and study its evolution. As a result, they find that the 
final-demand perspective leads to a less divergent picture in terms of countries' competitiveness, in particular 
for the case of France vs. Germany. Based on a shift-share analysis, they then decompose observed 
manufacturing performance (growth rate of exports and of total sales) in terms of geographical 
specialization, sectoral specialization, and country specific performance. Although the motivation behind this 
decomposition is similar to ours, the formal approach they employ seems unsuitable for identifying the full 
impact of demand factors. In contrast to our results, they only find a marginal impact of sectoral and 
geographical factors on the manufacturing performance (at least for aggregate manufacturing), and conclude 
by re-confirming the performance convergence of EU countries' manufacturing sector. 
For Miroudot (2019), the GVC nature of production and in particular the increased bundling of manufacturing 
products and service activities (e.g. 'servitisation', 'factoryless goods production') means that the traditional 
dichotomy between these two areas needs to be questioned. Even more this is the case in view of how 
statistical data on sectoral economic activity is currently constructed: following the System of National 
Accounts (SNA) 2008 and classifying firms according to their principal activity, manufacturing–in this context–
represents a simplifying aggregation of firms that mostly produce goods.(12) Further complicating the 
statistical classification are manufacturing firms that outsource their core assembly activity, as, e.g. in the 
case of Apple and Foxconn.(13) Emphasizing that these imperfections also affect the WIOD database, he still 
chooses to use it in order to explore three indicators of competitiveness and productivity that follow the GVC 
income concept of Timmer et al. (2013), concluding that the final demand perspective of this approach indeed 
increases consistency. 
 
                                           
(10)  On the other side, their study also comprehensively analyses the evolution of EU employment – called "GVC jobs" – which we review 
only briefly in Section 6. 
(11)  Another of the paper's key arguments is that the GVC income approach also takes into account domestic performance in the 
assessment of a country's competitiveness, which is not (or less) the case when just using export market shares. 
(12)  See also the data on service-related jobs in the manufacturing sector presented in Fig.17 of Veugelers (2013). 
(13)  Related to the changing nature of manufacturing, Bernard et al. (2017) study manufacturing employment in Denmark, and find that 
half of the decline observed between 1994 and 2007 is explained by manufacturing firms switching their industry to services. 
Hence, studies focussing on the 'official' manufacturing sector alone overestimate the loss of manufacturing capabilities, which to 
some extent is retained by the switching firms. 
 7 
 
3 Data and methods 
Studying the global macro-economy with its country and cross-sectoral linkages by using global input output 
data has become a widely used approach since the pioneering work of Hummels et al. (2001). Broadly 
speaking, the input-output accounting structure comprises all economic transactions between the possible 
combinations of included producing sectors and countries, differentiating between production used for further 
processing (intermediate demand) and production used for final consumption or investment (final demand). 
In this study we rely on the well-known World Input Output Database (WIOD), in its year 2016 version(14), 
complemented by the so-called Socio-Economic Accounts (SEA) and the tables in previous year prices 
released in 2019.(15) With annual frequency and encompassing the years between 2000 and 2014, WIOD 
covers 56 economic activities in 43 individual countries – including all EU member states – and an aggregate 
region representing the rest of the world. 
Based on this framework, we develop a methodology that allows decomposing any observed change of value 
added into a complete set of individual contributions, which represent the economic drivers of interest. We 
group these into two broad categories; one related to changes in final demand and the other one linked to 
shifts in participation in value chains, where the latter is interpreted as a measure of competitiveness. 
3.1 Decomposition of changes in value-added  
This sub-section provides details on how the decomposition is computed from the input-output dataset. For a 
given sector j (jJ) in country c (cC) we can write its total production as the sum of intermediate demand 
(ID) and final demand (FD) for its output in all countries: 
Yc,j = ∑ ID(c,j),(d,k)d,k + ∑ FD(c,j),dd          (1) 
where ID_(c,j),(d,k) is the intermediate demand of products from sector j in country c by sector k in country d, 
and FD_(c,j),(d) is the final demand of products from sector j in country c by country d. 
The value added generated in sector j of country c is determined by the difference between the value of its 
output and the cost of intermediates used in the production process: 
VAc,j = Yc,j − ∑ ID(d,k),(c,j)d,k          (2) 
Following the Leontief (1986) framework, we can rewrite the value added for a number of sectors J and 
countries C in matrix format: 
VA = vay × M × FD = {VAc,j}C×J,1
         (3) 
The first component is related to the value added share within one unit of output in sector j of country c that 
is retained by the producing sector itself: 
vayc,j =
VAc,j
Yc,j
           (4) 
which represents an element of vay, a diagonal matrix including the value added-to-output ratio for all the 
CxJ country-sector pairs. We later label associated effects of changes in this matrix with sec_vay. 
The second component in Equation 3 represents the country-sector interlinkages through the structure of 
intermediate demand for production processes. The corresponding matrix is a square one of CxJ dimension 
known as the Leontief inverse: 
M = (I − A)−1           (5) 
where I is the identity matrix and A corresponds to the matrix of technical coefficients. 
Each element of the matrix of technical coefficients represents the share of inputs from sector k of country d 
within one unit of output in sector j of country c, and can be further decomposed as follows: 
a(c,j),(d,k) =
ID(c,j),(d,k)
Yd,k
=
ID(c,j),(d,k)
∑ ID(c,j),(d,k)𝑐
×
∑ ID(c,j),(d,k)𝑐
Yd,k
= id(c,j),(d,k) × a(j),(d,k)    (6) 
                                           
(14)  Timmer et al. (2016). Data and methodology available at http://www.wiod.org/release16. 
(15)  Some minor adjustments have been made to the original dataset, mainly to correct methodological breaks stemming from the use 
of different national account systems over the sample period. 
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where id_(c,j),(d,k) corresponds to the share of inputs from sector k provided by each country (ms_id effects) 
and a_(j),(d,k) to an aggregate technical coefficient accounting for the total share of inputs from sector k used 
for one unit of output (sec_tech). 
Finally, the third component in Equation 3 encompasses the demand of products by economic agents for final 
use and is represented by a diagonal matrix of dimension CxJ. Each element of the diagonal matrix 
corresponds to the total final demand of products from a country-sector pair and is the result of aggregating 
across countries (d) and final demand components (v): 
FDc,j = ∑ FD(c,j),d[v]𝑑,𝑣           (7) 
where FD_(c,j),d[v] is the demand of products from sector j in country c for final use v in country d. WIOD 
differentiates three components of final demand: private consumption, public consumption, and gross capital 
formation. 
As it was the case for the matrix of technical coefficients, each element of the final demand matrix in 
Equation 7 can be further disaggregated as follows: 
FD(c,j),d[v] =  ∑ FD(c,j),d[v]c,j,d,v ×
∑ FD(c,j),d[v]c,j,v
∑ FD(c,j),d[v]c,j,d,v
×
∑ FD(c,j),d[v]c,j
∑ FD(c,j),d[v]c,j,v
×
∑ FD(c,j),d[v]c
∑ FD(c,j),d[v]c,j
×
FD(c,j),d[v]
∑ FD(c,j),d[v]c
= FDW × fdd ×
fdd[v] × fdj,d[v] × fd(c,j),d[v]         (8) 
where FDW is total world final demand (vol_W effects), fd_d is the share of country d in world final demand 
(vol_geo), fd_d[v] is the share of component v in total final demand of country d (comp_fd), fd_j,d[v] is the 
share of products from sector j in component v of final demand of country d (comp_prod), and fd_(c,j),d[v] is 
the share of country c in the supply of products from sector j to final use v in country d (ms_fd). 
Having decomposed each of the elements in the vector of value added shown in Equation 3, we now turn to 
the different factors contributing to changes in that vector. For a given sector j in country c, the change of 
value added can be written as:(16) 
∆VAc,j = ∆vayc,j × M × FD + vayc,j × ∆sec _techM × FD + vayc,j × ∆ms_idM × FD + vayc,j × M × ∆ms_fdFD +
vayc,j × M × ∆comp_fdFD + vayc,j × M × ∆comp_prodFD + vayc,j × M × ∆vol_geoFD + vayc,j × M × ∆vol_WFD
            (9) 
In view of the different economic nature of these contributions, they can be grouped into two broad 
categories, participation effects (pe) and demand effects (de): 
∆VAc,j = pesec _vay + pesec _tech + pems_id + pems_fd + decomp_fd + decomp_prod + devol_geo + devol_W (10) 
Demand effects would capture changes in value added due to shifts in the volume (vol_geo and vol_W) and 
composition (comp_fd and comp_prod) of final demand, which are associated with the impact of overall 
economic performance and income catch-up. In turn, participation effects would reflect changes in the 
distribution of value added across countries (ms_id and ms_fd) and sectors (vay and tech) generated by a 
unit of final demand in a given country for a given product, and hence could be associated with the 
competitiveness dimension. 
 
                                           
(16)  All interaction terms are equally distributed among contributing factors. 
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4 The manufacturing share in EU's economy and the role of relative 
prices  
4.1 Evolution of aggregate manufacturing 
According to nominal WIOD-based data, the contribution of the manufacturing sectors to total EU value added 
has declined from 18.7% in year 2000 to 15.3% in 2014, as seen in Figure 1. However, when adjusting the 
data for changes in the relative price between manufactured and all other goods and services(17), it turns out 
that the manufacturing share has not nearly fallen as much. Thus, almost two thirds of the total decline of 
the nominal value-added share of manufacturing until 2014 is solely due to the relative decline of the price 
of manufactured goods. 
This striking difference between the nominal and 'real prices' view has already been noticed for the US 
manufacturing sector, stimulating a lively debate on its meaning and implications (e.g. Baily and Bosworth 
2014, Schmalensee 2018). The prices of manufactured goods relative to others – mainly services and 
commodities – generally tend to fall, because of the larger productivity increases realized in this sector 
(mechanization, automation, etc.). On top of this, the time period considered here is characterized by the 
drastic technological advancement of the ICT sector, which continuously improved performance while hardly 
increasing – and sometimes decreasing– prices, as in the case of computer and electronics. 
In sum, analysis at the aggregate level shows that the seemingly dramatic decline of the value-added share 
of manufacturing has to be put into perspective, given that the relative price effect is responsible for the 
largest part of the observed effect. What is more, based on the corresponding variables in National Accounts 
released by Eurostat, data for the most recent years suggest that the manufacturing share might (nearly) be 
recovering its pre-crisis level. This would be in line with the long-term stability of the manufacturing share 
observed for the US (Baily and Bosworth 2014). 
 
Figure 1: Share of manufacturing sector in total value added generated in the EU economy, both for nominal 
(current prices) and real terms (chain-linked volumes, reference year 2010). Manufacturing includes all C-lettered 
activities in the NACE classification (see Appendix for detailed list). Data for 2000-2014 are based on WIOD and 
2015-2018 correspond to estimations using National Accounts from Eurostat. 
 
                                           
(17)  Real term figures throughout the whole report are presented in chain-linked volumes referred to 2010, which is the base year for 
price indices provided in WIOD's SEA. 
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4.2 Heterogeneity across individual manufacturing sectors  
Policy discussions on the declining EU manufacturing share typically focus on the evolution of the sector as a 
whole, but a more detailed analysis reveals strong sectoral heterogeneity and thus questions the 
meaningfulness of 'aggregate manufacturing'. 
Most importantly, there is a notable difference in the evolution of manufacturing sectors with lower and with 
higher technology content as defined by the OECD criteria (Galindo-Rueda and Verger, 2016). As can be seen 
in Table 1, if it were not for the relative price effect, which had a stronger impact on higher than on the lower 
tech activities, those sectors with higher technology content would have overall increased their share in the 
EU total economy, by 0.5 percentage points (pp). On the contrary, the declining share of lower tech sectors 
was driven to larger extent by the negative evolution in real terms. 
In particular, 'C26 – Electronics' shows a very peculiar pattern. On the one hand, it is among those activities 
with the strongest decline in nominal terms, being in fact the largest single contributor to the overall nominal 
decline of the manufacturing share. But on the other hand, its share in the total economy increased in volume 
terms. This contrasting effect is due to the extraordinary strong decline of the relative price of these goods, 
which is – as mentioned before – well known (Schmalensee 2018). As can be seen in Table 1, of the total 
relative price effect, which by itself lowered the EU manufacturing share by 2.4pp, 'C26 – Electronics' 
accounts for 0.8pp, i.e. one third. 
A similar pattern is observed for two other high tech manufacturing activities, 'C21 – Pharma' and 'C29 – 
Motor Vehicles', which also both increased their share in the total economy in real terms. On the other side, 
just three activities with lower technological content account for half of the total negative contributions in real 
terms, namely 'C13_15 – Textiles', 'C10_12 – Food' and 'C31_32 – Furniture (and other manufacturing)'. 
Evidently, the overall degree of heterogeneity is significant within the manufacturing sector and it follows that 
a generic statement on its aggregate performance is of limited relevance and might be misleading for policy 
analysis. We further study these patterns in the next sections, where we focus only on real term figures. 
. 
Table 1: Changes in percentage points in the value-added share of manufacturing in the EU overall economy 
between 2000 and 2014 based on WIOD, contributions by individual manufacturing sectors and aggregates, and by 
type of effect. Real terms refer to chain-linked volumes, reference year 2010. Due to rounding the nominal figure 
can deviate by ±0.1 from the sum of the two contributions. 
Nominal Price effects Real terms
C - Total Manufacturing Activities -3.5 -2.4 -1.1
Lower technological content -2.5 -0.9 -1.6
C10_12 - Food -0.3 0.0 -0.3
C13_15 - Textiles -0.4 0.0 -0.4
C16 - Wood -0.1 0.0 -0.1
C17 - Paper -0.2 -0.2 0.0
C18 - Printing -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
C19 - Petroleum -0.1 0.0 -0.1
C22 - Plastics -0.1 -0.2 0.0
C23 - Mineral Products -0.3 -0.1 -0.2
C24 - Basic Metals -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
C25 - Fabricated Metals -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
C31_32 - Furniture -0.2 0.1 -0.3
C33 - Repair 0.0 0.0 0.0
Higher technological content -1.0 -1.5 0.5
C20 - Chemicals -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
C21 - Pharma 0.1 -0.2 0.3
C26 - Electronics -0.5 -0.8 0.3
C27 - Electrical -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
C28 - Machinery -0.1 0.0 -0.1
C29 - Motor Vehicles -0.1 -0.2 0.2
C30 - Transport 0.0 -0.1 0.0
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5 The contribution of demand and participation effects  
The last section provided a first step for disentangling the drivers of different nature and policy relevance 
behind the manufacturing sector's declining weight, with a view on the objective of retaining a strong 
manufacturing base within the EU. On the one hand, it was shown that the change of relative prices had a 
strong influence, which is associated with global technological progress rather than with industrial policy. And 
on the other hand, we found that the analysis of manufacturing as a whole is of limited relevance since the 
behaviour of individual manufacturing sectors is strongly heterogeneous. 
Along these lines, we now present results from the full decomposition of the observed changes in the price-
adjusted value added share of individual manufacturing activities, differentiating between demand and 
participation effects. As explained in Section 3 on data and methods, the former capture changes in value 
added due to shifts in the volume and composition (geographical and sectoral) of final demand, whereas the 
latter reflect changes in the distribution of value added generated by one unit of final demand in a given 
country for a given product. Participation effects include shifts in value added retention and technological 
coefficients –both associated with redistribution at sectoral level, as well as changes in geographical market 
shares at the level of both inputs and final products. These effects can be viewed as indicators of sectoral 
competitiveness gains/losses. The objective of this section is to identify whether and for which specific sectors 
concerns about the competitiveness of EU manufacturing might be justified. Box 1 in following pages serves 
as a methodological guidance relying on one individual manufacturing industry, namely 'C26 – Electronics'. 
Table 2 shows the decomposition of the change in the real terms value added share of manufacturing 
activities.(18) It can be observed that on top of the sectoral heterogeneity found for the overall change, there 
also is considerable variation in terms of the different drivers' contribution to the sectors' evolution. For 
instance, for the two broad aggregations based on technological content, we find that both the demand 
composition and the sectoral participation effect had impacts with opposite signs: for low-tech manufacturing 
these two effects alone would have lowered its value added share in the economy by 1.5 percentage points, 
while for high-tech they would imply an increase by 0.3 percentage points. 
The effect of demand composition can be explained by the dampening impact of the crises aftermath on EU 
investment and durable consumption, which has taken its toll on manufacturing inputs –mainly those with 
lower technological content. In addition, shifting weights in the consumption basket away from basic goods 
(e.g. food and textiles) have not only benefited services but also high-tech products, such as electronics or 
pharmaceuticals –the latter also being supported by ageing populations. 
And on the other side, the sectoral participation effect – negative for lower, positive for higher tech sectors – 
reflects the change in the sectoral composition of the value added generated within production chains, mainly 
due to technological progress that is increasing the use and participation of electronics (as shown in Table 2 
by its significant positive 'sectoral participation effect'). 
A more homogenous picture emerges for the demand volume effect, which shows positive or neutral figures 
in both technological subsectors and across most individual manufacturing activities. Positive contributions of 
this driver occur as the result of the stronger economic growth in foreign than in domestic markets observed 
during the considered time period, as manufactured goods are highly tradable and hence profit more than 
other sectors from the growth of export markets. In fact, 22% of EU manufacturing output was exported to 
non-EU countries in 2014 compared to 6% for the rest of the economy. 
Finally, changes in global market shares, which we associate with competitiveness, made only a limited 
negative or neutral contribution for the vast majority of manufacturing industries, i.e. the loss (or gain) of EU 
market shares for most manufacturing goods was in line with those experienced by the EU economy as 
whole. Still, the overall figure of a -0.8 percentage points reduction of the EU manufacturing share is quite 
significant and mostly stems from only two sectors, 'C13_15 – Textiles' on the low-tech side and 'C26 – 
Electronics' within the high-tech group. As shown in Table 2, these two together explain 0.6pp out of the 0.8pp 
loss in the value added share of the manufacturing sector. The former is unsurprising and reflects the rise of 
Asian textile production and the accompanying loss of EU value added in that sector. The latter might be less 
expected, given the overall gain of weight of electronics. However, as explained with detail in Box 1, the 
negative contribution captures the fact that within the strongly positive effect of the shift of demand and 
technology towards electronics, the market share of EU value added actually declined (but the net effect is 
                                           
(18)  It is important to keep in mind that the decomposition is applied to the manufacturing share. As a consequence, a positive 
contribution from, say, the demand effect means that EU manufacturing value added increased relatively more (or shrank relatively 
less) than the EU's total value added. 
 12 
 
still positive, i.e. growth of overall size dominated the EU's shrinking share, leading to an increase of value 
added). Finally, it's worth highlighting that for this driver the only noticeable positive impact is found for 'C21 
– Pharma'. 
In sum, we find that the interplay of various trends has determined the overall change of the EU's 
manufacturing share. First, higher economic growth in non-EU markets had a positive effect, particularly for 
export-oriented high-tech manufacturing activities. Second, crises legacies within the EU and worldwide shifts 
in the consumption basket are translating into lower relative demand for manufacturing products, with the 
only exceptions of electronics and pharmaceuticals. Third, technological progress is increasing the use and 
value added participation of electronics in production chains. And fourth, EU competitiveness losses, as a 
result of changing global market shares, were not significantly different from non-manufacturing sectors 
except for textiles and electronics. These trends will be further analysed and EU compared to its global 
competitors in the following sub-section 
 
Table 2: Changes in percentage points in the real terms (chain-linked volumes, reference year 2010) value-added 
share of manufacturing in the EU overall economy between 2000 and 2014 based on WIOD, contributions by 
individual manufacturing sectors and aggregates, and by type of effect. Due to rounding the first columns' figure 
can deviate by ±0.1 from the sum of the four contributions. 
Box 1. Methodological guidance: the case of 'C26 – Electronics' 
Results presented throughout this paper correspond to the aggregate net effect of changes in individual 
transactions between different sectors and countries. The purpose of this box is to provide a specific example 
to have a better understanding on what's behind the decomposition explained in Section 3. We have chosen 
'C26 – Electronics' based on its relevance for the analysis presented here. 
Value added in this sector increased in the EU at an average annual rate of 4.3% between 2000 and 2014 in 
real terms, which favourably contrasts with the 1.2% recorded for the total economy, and resulting in an 
increase this sector's weight of 0.3 pp over the whole period (as shown in Table 2). As explained in the main 
text, this differential is the net result of positive demand and sectoral participation effects against the loss of 
global market shares. 
Namely, around 35% of the output from EU electronics' manufacturers is exported to non-EU regions, which 
has allowed the sector to benefit from higher growth in those areas compared with other activities that are 
more oriented towards EU markets. In addition, as shown in Figure A, both the share of electronics in world 
final demand and the share of electronics used as inputs for global output (i.e. the corresponding technical 
coefficients explained in Section 3) have increased over time as a result of income and technological 
developments shifting consumer and producer preferences, respectively. These factors have been strongly 
amplified by the increase of the value added share within one unit of output that is retained on average by 
EU electronics' manufacturers, reflecting efficiency gains against other sectors (Figure B). 
Volume Composition Sectoral Mkt. shares
C - Total Manufacturing Activities -1.1 1.0 -1.0 -0.2 -0.8
Lower technological content -1.6 0.3 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4
C10_12 - Food -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0
C13_15 - Textiles -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3
C16 - Wood -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
C17 - Paper 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C18 - Printing -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
C19 - Petroleum -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
C22 - Plastics 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
C23 - Mineral Products -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
C24 - Basic Metals -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
C25 - Fabricated Metals -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
C31_32 - Furniture -0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
C33 - Repair 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Higher technological content 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.3 -0.5
C20 - Chemicals -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
C21 - Pharma 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
C26 - Electronics 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 -0.3
C27 - Electrical -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
C28 - Machinery -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
C29 - Motor Vehicles 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
C30 - Transport 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real terms
Demand effects Participation effects
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On the contrary, EU electronics' manufacturers have been subject to stronger competition from non-EU 
producers, limiting the positive impact of the aforementioned tailwinds. As shown in Figures C and D, this is 
reflected in a growing share of imports of electronics for both final and intermediate demand, as well as in a 
declining participation of EU exports in the use of electronics in the rest of the world. Overall, we estimate 
that EU losses in global market shares for the electronics' sector dragged 0.3 pp from its share in total 
economy between 2000 and 2014 (as shown in the last column of Table 2). 
  
Moreover, when considering the global context, a couple of other features undermine further the initial 
favourable assessment for EU electronics' manufacturers. First, the increase of both the use of these products 
as inputs in production processes and their value added-to-output ratio – shown respectively in Figures A and 
B – has been more intense in the rest of the world and hence contributed more positively to value added 
generation in Electronics than in the EU. And second, the overall negative growth differential between the EU 
and non-EU economies, which was shown to have a positive contribution in Electronics when compared to 
total EU economy (as shown in Table 2), exerts in this case a sizeable drag on value added growth for EU 
electronics' manufacturers relative to non-EU producers 
5.1 EU's manufacturing in the global context 
Motivated by the concern about the EU's manufacturing share, we so far analysed the manufacturing sector 
only relative to the EU overall economy. This implicitly puts activities on the same footing that are not real ly 
Figure A: Share of products from 'C26 – Electronics' in total 
global final demand and output. In real terms (chain-linked 
volumes, reference year 2010), based on WIOD.
Figure B: Value added share within one unit of EU output, 
total and 'C26 – Electronics'. In real terms (chain-linked 
volumes, reference year 2010), based on WIOD.
Figure C: Share of EU imports from non-EU countries as 
percentage of total final demand and use of inputs from 
'C26 – Electronics' in the EU. In real terms (chain-linked 
volumes, reference year 2010), based on WIOD. 
Figure D: Share of EU exports to non-EU countries as 
percentage of total final demand and use of inputs from 
'C26 – Electronics' in non-EU countries. In real terms (chain-
linked volumes, reference year 2010), based on WIOD. 
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comparable due to their very different degree of tradability. Therefore, this section compares the EU 
manufacturing sector to the manufacturing sectors of a set of relevant competitor countries – namely the 
United States and Japan within developed economies, and China and India among the emerging world. The 
objective is to identify whether and in which specific sectors concern about the competitiveness of EU 
manufacturing might be justified from a global perspective. From a methodological point of view, the focus 
on manufacturing bears the advantage of comparing 'likes with likes', and thus limiting the influence of 
relative price effects to the one between countries and exchange rates, which – due to the high tradability of 
manufactured goods –should be minor. 
In aggregate terms, and using chain-linked volumes referred to 2010, EU manufacturing activities accounted 
for close to 30% of worldwide sectoral value added at the beginning of the period – two thirds together with 
the US and Japan – and well above China's 6%. The picture in 2014 was rather different, with China showing 
the largest individual country share (27%) and the contribution of the EU being reduced by a third to 21%. As 
shown in Figure 2, this positive trend for China (and other emerging economies like India) and the 
corresponding negative evolution for developed countries was already in place before the Great Recession and 
does not seem to level afterwards. As a result, the EU-US-Japan bloc represented less than a half of 
worldwide manufacturing value added in 2014. 
 
Figure 2: Share in value added generated worldwide in the manufacturing sector, in real terms (chain-linked 
volumes, reference year 2010). Manufacturing includes all C-lettered activities in the NACE classification (see 
Appendix for detailed list). Data based on WIOD. 
A priori, there are a number of factors that might explain the changing geographical shares of the total 
manufacturing value added. For a better understanding we again apply the decomposition presented in 
Section 3. Table 3 shows changes of country shares in real terms between 2000 and 2014 and the 
contribution of each driver for the manufacturing aggregate, the two low/high tech subsectors and the three 
individual activities previously highlighted, i.e. 'C13_15 – Textiles', 'C21 – Pharma' and 'C26 – Electronics'.  
First, we observe that the largest part of the redistribution in global manufacturing value added – more than 
60% in the case of the EU – can be attributed to demand effects, in particular to volume ones – i.e. changes 
in the geographical weight distribution. The latter is a consequence of the fact that economic growth has been 
higher in China (and other emerging economies) than in the developed world, which has stimulated the 
stronger growth of manufacturing value added in these regions. In addition, the developed countries' global 
share also diminished due to an overall shift in the composition of final demand away from manufacturing 
goods (mainly on their home market), due to the lasting effects of the crises that restrained expenditure in 
durable consumption and investment. As the Table's second block (low vs. high tech sectors) shows, this 
negative composition effect affects low-tech but does not extend to the aggregate of high-tech 
manufacturing activities, with electronics and pharma in particular recording a positive demand composition 
effect. Positive contributions across the board are observed for China, driven by income effects and fast-
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growing investment, which is intensive in the use of manufacturing. Electronics and pharma show up again as 
the most noticeable exceptions, recording positive demand composition effects within developed economies. 
 
Table 3: Changes in the real terms (chain-linked volumes, reference year 2010) value-added share in worldwide 
manufacturing between 2000 and 2014 based on WIOD, change for the aggregate sector, and contributions by 
subsectors and selected individual activities by type of effect. 
Second, sectoral participation effects go in the same direction for most countries, with positive contributions 
in high-tech activities and negative for low-tech, mainly as a result of an increasing relative use of electronics 
in production processes. The net effect – implying an increase in their global share – is positive for the US, 
Japan and China, while the EU stands out as noticeable exception, even showing a negative – albeit small – 
effect for high-tech activities. The latter could be the result of either detrimental specialization patterns or a 
softer shift in the nature of production processes. In any case, the EU clearly contrasts with respect to the US 
and Japan, which both show large positive sectoral participation effects in high tech, mainly attributable to 
the electronics' sector. Overall, the EU's relatively lower sectoral participation explains almost 20% of its loss 
in the global manufacturing share 
And third, we find that geographical participation effects, that is, changes in market shares for intermediate 
and final products provision, has substantially contributed to the expansion of China's global share, similarly 
for low-tech and high-tech manufacturing subsectors, and to a lower extent to that of India. On the contrary, 
losses for developed countries are recorded across the board, although the adverse effect seems to be more 
Volume Composition Sectoral Mkt. shares
European Union -9.0 -4.4 -1.2 -1.7 -1.6
United States -6.2 -2.8 -0.4 0.7 -3.7
Japan -4.6 -2.6 -0.2 0.4 -2.2
China 17.4 7.8 1.4 1.4 6.7
India 1.1 0.8 0.2 -0.3 0.4
Rest-of-World 1.3 1.3 0.3 -0.7 0.4
Subsectors by technological content
European Union -6.5 -2.8 -1.4 -1.6 -0.7
United States -4.9 -1.6 -0.9 -1.4 -1.1
Japan -4.7 -1.9 -0.7 -1.2 -1.0
China 8.6 5.0 0.5 -0.5 3.6
India 0.6 0.6 0.1 -0.3 0.2
Rest-of-World -2.0 0.8 -0.4 -2.2 -0.1
European Union -2.5 -1.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.9
United States -1.2 -1.2 0.4 2.1 -2.6
Japan 0.1 -0.8 0.4 1.6 -1.1
China 8.7 2.8 0.9 1.9 3.1
India 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
Rest-of-World 3.2 0.5 0.7 1.6 0.5
Selected manufacturing activities
European Union -1.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5
United States -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Japan -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2
China 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.6
India 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest-of-World -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1
European Union 0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1
United States -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.3
Japan 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0
China 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest-of-World 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
European Union 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.5
United States 1.2 -0.3 0.3 2.0 -0.8
Japan 0.7 -0.1 0.2 1.0 -0.4
China 2.0 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.8
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest-of-World 1.9 0.2 0.4 1.1 0.2
Higher technological content
C13_15 - Textiles
C26 - Electronics
C21 - Pharma
Lower technological content
TOTAL     
(real terms)
Demand effects Participation effects
C - Total Manufacturing Activities
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limited in the EU when compared with the US and Japan, except for the case of textiles. The EU's pharma 
sector even slightly increased its market share, but this remains an exception in view of the overall negative 
contribution of this driver, which accounts for close to 20% of the total reduction of its global manufacturing 
share. 
As mentioned in the methodology, participation effects can be associated with the competitiveness dimension 
and hence its analysis has the most direct relevance for industrial policy. Accordingly, from the evidence 
shown in this sub-section, we conclude that concerns in the EU should focus on the electronics' sector, also in 
view of its pivotal role for global technological change. On the one hand, the increasing use of these high-tech 
products in value chains seems to have brought less benefit for EU than other regions' companies, including 
developed countries. And on the other hand, electronics has been the most affected manufacturing activity by 
EU losses in global market shares. As opposed to the similarly affected textile sector, for which 
competitiveness losses would be a more natural trend in face of competition by low-wage emerging 
economies, a persistent negative trend for electronics could eventually harm innovation capacities and erode 
productivity growth. The latter would strongly depend on whether the competiveness losses in electronics' 
manufacturing has been compensated elsewhere in the production chain by services with high technological 
content, such as scientific R&D, software development or IT services.(19) 
                                           
(19)  Galindo-Rueda and Verger (2016) update the OECD taxonomy of economic activities based on technological intensity to include 
services. 
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6 A comparison with the manufacturing value chain perspective  
In the previous sections we analysed the EU's manufacturing share with respect to the value added generated 
in the whole EU economy and worldwide in that same sector. This 'value added perspective' illustrates how 
manufacturing activities contribute to the generation of value added at different stages of all existing value 
chains. Some examples would be mineral products used as building materials for housing, chemical inputs for 
plastics' production, or household expenditure in textiles. 
Now, in turn, we focus on how value added is generated in value chains that have at their final stage 
manufacturing products for consumption or investment, i.e. manufacturing value chains. This 'value chain 
perspective' coincides with the GVC income measure of Timmer et al. (2013) and compares with the value 
added view as follows: 
 Both include manufacturing inputs for manufacturing final products (e.g. chemical inputs for plastic 
houseware or food packaging purchased by households), as well as all the value added in the final 
stage of manufacturing before reaching consumers (e.g. wages and profits distributed by a car 
manufacturer). 
 Manufacturing inputs that participate in value chains of non-manufacturing final products are 
excluded (e.g. mineral products used as building materials for housing, or chemical inputs for food 
packaging purchased by restaurants). On average, these inputs account for 40% of worldwide 
manufacturing value added. 
 In turn, manufacturing value chains include value added generated in non-manufacturing activities, 
whenever their output serves as inputs in any of the stages of the full value chain of a final 
manufacturing product (e.g. legal services provided to tobacco or pharmaceutical companies). In 
aggregate terms, non-manufacturing activities represents around half of the total value added in 
manufacturing value chains, thus becoming a critical element of their competitiveness. 
Having clarified the differences between both analytical perspectives, in this section we compare the 
participation of the EU in global manufacturing value chains to previous results on the value added generated 
in the EU's manufacturing sector. 
First, in Figure 3 we show that the economic weight of manufacturing in the EU's total economy becomes 
higher when adopting the value chain perspective, around 4pp more than the share of manufacturing value 
added that we already showed in Figure 1 of Section 4. Nevertheless, this difference has remained quite 
stable throughout the sample period, with both approaches yielding a very similar trend and decline in recent 
years vis-à-vis the pre-crisis period (a reduction of 1.1pp using the value added perspective and 1.4pp for the 
value chain perspective).  
 
Figure 3: Share of manufacturing sector ('value added perspective') and manufacturing value chains ('value chain 
perspective') in total value added generated in the EU economy, in real terms (chain-linked volumes, reference year 
2010). Based on WIOD. 
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Second, Table 4 shows that the decomposition of the net change of the EU's global share for manufacturing 
value chains does not differ significantly at the aggregate level from the one obtained under the value added 
perspective (Table 2 in Section 5), with demand effects almost neutral and participation effects explaining the 
overall decline of manufacturing's weight within the EU economy. 
 
Table 4: Changes in the real terms (chain-linked volumes, reference year 2010) value-added share of 
manufacturing value chains in the EU overall economy between 2000 and 2014 based on WIOD, contributions by 
individual manufacturing sectors and aggregates, and by type of effect. 
However, on a more disaggregated basis, a number of interesting findings arise. First, sectoral participation 
effects are almost negligible when using the value chain perspective because the substitution of input 
products does not generate in this case a redistribution of value added if they are sourced from the EU in a 
similar proportion. Second, the generation of value added is more concentrated on certain manufacturing 
value chains, translating in particular into a higher share for final demand-oriented manufacturing activities 
(20), for which demand and participation effects are hence exacerbated; for instance, the effect of a lower 
share of food products in the consumption basket (negative composition demand effect) was previously 
spread throughout all contributing manufacturing activities when using the value added perspective, while 
now it's concentrated within the 'C10_12 – Food' value chain. Third, final manufacturing products with higher 
technological content rely to a larger extent on foreign markets than value added generated in those sectors, 
so volume demand effects are more positive when using the value chain perspective. And fourth, the effects 
of shifting market shares show a very similar pattern under both approaches, suggesting that 
competitiveness readings do not differ substantially whether looking at value added generated in 
manufacturing activities or the manufacturing value chain; we find only two exceptions, 'C19 – Petroleum' 
(where the EU lost global participation in its sizable value chain but gained in sectoral value added), and 'C24 
– Basic Metals' (the opposite case, to the detriment of the EU providing these extensively used inputs to other 
value chains). 
Now we turn attention to the global comparison. Figure 4 shows the global share of value added generated by 
manufacturing value chains for different economic areas. First, we observe that trends do not differ 
significantly from the ones observed for manufacturing value added (Figure 2 in Sub-section 5.1), confirming 
the persistently declining share for the EU, US and Japan to the benefit mainly of China (and other emerging 
economies). However, the decrease of the EU's share is somewhat less pronounced when considering 
manufacturing value chains, suggesting that the EU's contribution in the form of service inputs has positively 
contributed to its role in global manufacturing. 
                                           
(20)  Food products, motor vehicles and machinery concentrate around 50% of global value added in manufacturing value chains in 
contrast with a third for manufacturing value added. On the contrary, typical manufacturing inputs, such as metals, minerals or 
plastics have their weight halved to 10% when using the first approach. 
Volume Composition Sectoral Mkt. shares
C - Total Manufacturing Activities -1.4 1.3 -1.4 0.0 -1.3
Lower technological content -1.8 0.1 -1.6 0.1 -0.5
C10_12 - Food -0.4 0.1 -0.7 0.0 0.1
C13_15 - Textiles -0.7 0.1 -0.3 0.0 -0.4
C16 - Wood -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
C17 - Paper 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
C18 - Printing 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C19 - Petroleum 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
C22 - Plastics 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C23 - Mineral Products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C24 - Basic Metals 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C25 - Fabricated Metals -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
C31_32 - Furniture -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.1
C33 - Repair -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Higher technological content 0.4 1.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.8
C20 - Chemicals -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
C21 - Pharma 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1
C26 - Electronics 0.0 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.5
C27 - Electrical -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2
C28 - Machinery -0.1 0.4 -0.3 0.0 -0.1
C29 - Motor Vehicles 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1
C30 - Transport 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Real terms
Demand effects Participation effects
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Figure 4: Share in value added generated worldwide in manufacturing value chains, in real terms (chain-linked 
volumes, reference year 2010). Data based on WIOD. 
And second, the observable differences in the absolute level of the shares between the two perspectives give 
a hint on specialization patterns across economic areas. Table 5 shows a detailed decomposition of global 
shares for each of the economic activities contributing to manufacturing value chains. In rough outlines, India 
and Rest-of-World record a higher contribution to value added in manufacturing value chains due to their 
supply of certain services and raw materials, respectively, whereas shares for Japan, US and China were 
larger in manufacturing value added for their prevalent participation in downstream activities (particularly 
high-tech manufacturing in the two developed economies); finally, the aggregate picture does not change 
much for the EU, showing a slightly higher contribution under the manufacturing value chain perspective. In 
the following sub-section we complement this analysis with focus on trade specialization patterns between 
the EU and the rest of the world. 
 
Table 5: Share in value added generated worldwide in manufacturing value chains, by economic area across group 
and individual NACE sector. Data based on WIOD (chain-linked volumes, reference year 2010). 
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EU US Japan China India Rest-of-World
EU US Japan China India RoW TOTAL
Total Economic Activities 22.1 15.7 7.0 20.3 3.9 31.0 100.0
 Manufacturing 22.6 17.1 9.4 21.8 3.0 26.1 100.0
C-L Manufacturing - Low Tech 21.9 14.6 8.3 22.3 3.8 29.0 100.0
C-H Manufacturing - High Tech 23.2 19.5 10.6 21.4 2.1 23.3 100.0
Non-Manufacturing
 Primary Activities 6.9 10.8 1.6 23.6 4.8 52.3 100.0
A Agriculture 9.9 9.0 2.9 29.2 7.9 41.1 100.0
B Mining 4.0 12.5 0.4 18.1 1.8 63.2 100.0
 Utilities 23.0 8.7 4.5 19.5 3.5 40.8 100.0
D Electrictiy, Gas 18.3 7.5 4.5 21.7 4.1 43.9 100.0
E Water, Waste 44.8 14.6 4.5 9.3 0.3 26.6 100.0
 Logistic services 24.3 12.2 5.9 18.3 6.5 32.8 100.0
G Trade 23.5 12.4 5.9 18.0 7.3 32.9 100.0
H Transport 26.1 11.8 5.8 19.1 4.7 32.5 100.0
 Business services 31.6 20.6 5.9 14.4 3.4 24.0 100.0
I Accommodation, Food 16.7 13.1 12.3 27.5 2.8 27.7 100.0
J Information, Communication 33.3 22.4 9.0 7.1 7.0 21.2 100.0
K Finance 21.6 10.7 6.3 25.9 8.1 27.5 100.0
L Real Estate 42.9 16.1 2.7 16.7 0.1 21.5 100.0
M Professional, Technical 32.6 28.3 5.8 12.8 1.1 19.4 100.0
N Administrative, Support 40.7 24.2 3.2 0.7 0.1 31.1 100.0
 Other Activities 32.9 17.1 5.2 14.5 4.9 25.3 100.0
F Construction 40.5 8.9 6.2 7.9 5.9 30.5 100.0
O Public Administration 31.1 36.0 5.1 6.0 0.0 21.9 100.0
P Education 49.6 8.3 3.9 11.8 1.2 25.2 100.0
Q Health 35.9 9.7 12.9 11.2 1.4 29.0 100.0
R&S Personal Services 21.7 12.2 3.8 29.4 9.8 23.1 100.0
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With respect to the contribution of the different factors to changes in global manufacturing shares, figures in 
Table 6 using the value chain perspective look in principle similar to those in Table 3 (based on the value 
added perspective), although some differences are worth highlighting. First, the dispersion in demand volume 
effects is less pronounced using the value chain perspective, showing developed economies with a less 
negative contribution due to their relative specialization in non-manufacturing upstream activities serving 
manufacturing value chains, whereas the opposite is observed for China. Second, demand composition effects 
are more intense for the EU and China; by definition the value chain perspective is a final demand approach 
and those components that are more manufacturing-intense are durable consumption and investment, which 
show a very contrasting picture between these economic areas during the sample period. Third, this same 
effect is found across the board for 'C13_15 – Textiles' and 'C26 – Electronics', which manufacture products 
that have changed substantially their weight in the consumption basket over the last years. Fourth, as 
explained before for the analysis on the share in total EU economy, sectoral participation effects are more 
moderate from a value chain perspective than when considering individual manufacturing activities or 
aggregates by technological content; the most remarkable example would be 'C26 – Electronics', for which its 
increase use as inputs in different production processes was highly beneficial in value added terms and 
allowed compensating other negative factors in developed economies to gain global shares. 
Table 6: Changes in the real terms (chain-linked volumes, reference year 2010) value-added share in worldwide 
manufacturing value chains between 2000 and 2014 based on WIOD, change for the aggregate sector, and 
contributions by subsectors and selected individual activities by type of effect. 
Volume Composition Sectoral Mkt. shares
European Union -8.4 -4.3 -1.8 0.0 -2.3
United States -4.8 -2.1 -0.3 0.8 -3.1
Japan -3.7 -1.7 0.0 0.2 -2.1
China 15.0 5.7 1.9 0.2 7.2
India 1.9 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.4
Rest-of-World 0.1 1.2 0.1 -1.1 0.0
Subsectors by technological content
European Union -5.7 -2.7 -2.2 0.2 -1.0
United States -2.9 -1.2 -1.1 0.3 -0.9
Japan -2.6 -1.1 -0.8 0.0 -0.8
China 5.4 2.7 0.1 0.1 2.6
India 1.2 0.9 0.2 -0.1 0.3
Rest-of-World -1.7 0.5 -1.4 -0.6 -0.2
European Union -2.7 -1.6 0.3 -0.2 -1.3
United States -1.9 -0.9 0.7 0.5 -2.2
Japan -1.1 -0.7 0.8 0.1 -1.4
China 9.6 3.0 1.8 0.1 4.6
India 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2
Rest-of-World 1.8 0.7 1.5 -0.5 0.2
Selected manufacturing activities
European Union -1.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.6
United States -0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.5
Japan -0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3
China 1.6 0.5 -0.2 0.1 1.3
India 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Rest-of-World -0.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.1
European Union 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1
United States -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
China 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
India 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest-of-World 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
European Union -0.4 -0.2 0.5 -0.1 -0.7
United States -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.5
Japan -0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.5
China 2.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 1.5
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest-of-World 0.7 0.1 0.7 -0.2 0.1
C13_15 - Textiles
C26 - Electronics
C21 - Pharma
Lower technological content
TOTAL 
(real terms)
Demand effects Participation effects
C - Total Manufacturing Activities
Higher technological content
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And fifth, what should be considered the most relevant feature for competitiveness considerations, 
participation effects in the form of shifts in market shares show a worse picture using the value chain 
approach for the EU, and even higher gains for China, particularly in high tech manufacturing but also in the 
case of 'C13_15 – Textiles'. These results suggest that value added redistribution within value chains has 
taken place beyond manufacturing activities themselves and their associated domestic supply chains, 
reaching genuine competitiveness losses (gains) within non-manufacturing upstream sectors in the EU 
(China). On the contrary, a less negative outlook is observed for the US, which could be explained by a larger 
capacity to split value chain processes, retaining a larger share of the domestic supply chain and hence 
limiting the loss of global participation (as observed for 'C26 – Electronics'). 
6.1 EU trade specialization within manufacturing value chains  
The analysis based on the value chain perspective presented so far corresponds to total value added 
generated across all participating activities serving global final demand of manufacturing products. In this 
sub-section we turn attention to the contribution of the different economic sectors to the value added that is 
traded between the EU and the Rest-of-World (ROW). In particular, we analyse the degree and evolution of EU 
specialization following the approach in Balassa (1965), but using the concept of Trade in Value Added (TiVA) 
– as described in Stehrer (2012) – instead of the standard gross exports. 
The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) of the EU in sector j is computed using a hyperbolic tangent 
transformation that allows for a symmetric index: 
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑗
𝐸𝑈 = 𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ (𝑙𝑛
𝑉𝐴𝑗
𝐸𝑈→𝑅𝑂𝑊
∑ 𝑉𝐴𝑗
𝐸𝑈→𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑗
𝑉𝐴𝑗
𝐸𝑈↔𝑅𝑂𝑊
∑ 𝑉𝐴𝑗
𝐸𝑈↔𝑅𝑂𝑊
𝑗
) ∈ [−1,1]        (11) 
where VA_j_EU→ROW (VA_j_ROW→EU) accounts for EU (ROW) value added of sector j in final demand of 
ROW (EU). 
We are particularly interested in identifying changes in specialization associated with gains or losses of 
competitiveness, i.e. due to shifts in country market shares for the provision of intermediate and final 
products. For that purpose we build TiVA time series taking only into account the impact of this factor. 
The first two columns in Table 7 give an order of magnitude for the weight of NACE sections and sectoral 
groups participating in TiVA between the EU and ROW in 2014. Then we show for these activities the 
corresponding EU RCA in 2000 and 2014, as well as the change over the whole period, for which we consider 
both all driving factors and the restricted computation of TiVA as described above. 
Besides confirming the intuition that ROW is strongly specialized in primary activities serving manufacturing 
value chains, the RCA analysis provides a couple of interesting highlights. First, the EU increased its degree of 
specialization in business services, such as ICT, professional and technical activities, or administrative and 
support services (NACE sections J, M and N, respectively), to a larger extent when considering only the effect 
of shifts in market shares. In particular, we observe that the impact on these upstream activities was lower 
when relocating from EU to ROW stages of manufacturing value chains that serve EU final demand instead of 
ROW. And second, within the manufacturing value added, the most striking result is that the degree of EU 
specialization in high-tech industries declined when considering all driving factors, but this does not hold for 
the restricted measure. EU de-specialization in this sector was then not driven by competitiveness but other 
factors, namely a higher value added share of high-tech products – electronics in particular – manufactured 
in ROW within one unit of output. 
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Table 7: Trade in Value Added (TiVA) for manufacturing value chains between the EU and Rest-of-World (ROW), 
weight in 2014 and EU Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) in 2000 and 2014, by group and individual NACE 
sector of value added. Based on WIOD and value added in real terms (chain-linked volumes due to all factors and 
only to 'participation effects - market shares', reference year 2010). 
6.2 EU employment in manufacturing value chains 
We complement the analysis on the EU role in manufacturing value chains with the employment dimension, 
which has also raised concerns in the de-manufacturing debate. In particular, we follow the concept of GVC-
jobs as in Timmer et al. (2013), i.e. the employment across all economic activities and geographical areas that 
participate throughout all stages of a manufacturing value chain. 
In the first two columns of Table 8 we show for 2000 and 2014 the sectoral disaggregation of EU 
employment(21) serving all manufacturing value chains. As mentioned before, we confirm the importance of 
non-manufacturing activities, which represent around 50% of total employment and mainly correspond to 
agriculture, logistic services (trade and transport), professional and technical activities, and administrative and 
support services. 
Table 8 also provides the EU employment change between 2000 and 2014, differentiating by geographical 
area of final demand (EU or ROW). The middle columns consider all driving factors of EU employment, while 
the last two take only into account the impact of shifts in market shares, as we did for EU-ROW TiVA in the 
previous section. 
According to our estimations, 6.3 million (or 13%) jobs serving manufacturing value chains were lost in the EU 
during that period. There is however a great deal of heterogeneity at a more disaggregated level. First, the net 
change was the result of strong job destruction within those activities participating in value chains serving EU 
final demand (10.4 millions), compared with a considerable gain in the case of ROW final demand (4.1 
millions). And second, the reduction of EU employment was concentrated in manufacturing activities – low-
tech industries in particular – and agriculture (a total of 7.3 millions), while there was in fact job creation in 
other economic activities, such as business services (up to 1.2 million within those serving manufacturing 
value chains ending in ROW). 
(21) We indistinctively refer to employment in terms of people or jobs, although the variable used from WIOD SEA corresponds to the
number of persons engaged.
Total 
change
Mkt. 
Shares 
effect
Total Economic Activities 100.0 100.0
 Manufacturing 50.8 43.8 0.18 0.06 -0.12 -0.02
C-L Manufacturing - Low Tech 19.0 20.3 0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07
C-H Manufacturing - High Tech 31.8 23.5 0.28 0.12 -0.16 0.01
Non-Manufacturing
 Primary Activities 3.1 21.0 -0.88 -0.86 0.03 -0.04
A Agriculture 1.9 5.9 -0.78 -0.59 0.19 0.04
B Mining 1.2 15.2 -0.92 -0.95 -0.03 -0.08
 Utilities 2.7 3.5 0.02 -0.11 -0.13 -0.01
D Electrictiy, Gas 1.7 3.0 -0.09 -0.28 -0.19 -0.07
E Water, Waste 1.0 0.5 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.14
 Logistic services 17.4 15.3 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05
G Trade 11.7 10.3 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06
H Transport 5.8 5.0 0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.02
 Business services 22.7 14.3 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.07
I Accommodation, Food 0.5 0.7 -0.31 -0.13 0.18 0.05
J Information, Communication 3.3 1.9 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.09
K Finance 3.9 3.7 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.03
L Real Estate 2.9 1.2 0.28 0.30 0.02 0.08
M Professional, Technical 7.6 4.4 0.15 0.21 0.05 0.07
N Administrative, Support 4.5 2.5 0.18 0.22 0.04 0.15
 Other Activities 3.3 2.1 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.09
F Construction 1.1 0.5 0.27 0.26 -0.01 0.10
O Public Administration 0.8 0.6 -0.17 0.15 0.31 0.22
P Education 0.5 0.2 0.35 0.35 0.00 0.08
Q Health 0.2 0.1 -0.08 0.21 0.29 0.11
R&S Personal Services 0.7 0.7 -0.11 -0.02 0.09 -0.07
% TiVA (2014) EU RCA
2000-2014
EU → 
ROW
ROW → 
EU
2000 2014
23 
With respect to the role of competitiveness, we estimate that shifts in market shares explained around 15% 
(or 1 million jobs) of the aggregate employment loss in the EU. Similar shares are accounted for the decline in 
manufacturing value chains serving EU and gains for those ending in ROW. On a sectoral basis, the main 
exceptions are agriculture, for which positive contributions from competitiveness are compensated by other 
factors, and the opposite is observed for professional and technical activities, and administrative and support 
services. 
Other factors than competitiveness played then overall a much more relevant role in shaping EU employment 
dynamics. First, apparent labour productivity increased significantly within agriculture, manufacturing and 
logistic services, being in EU markets insufficiently offset by demand growth and hence having a negative 
impact on sectoral employment. Second, strong economic growth in non-EU markets was the main driver of 
EU employment across all activities serving manufacturing value chains ending in ROW. And third, EU 
employment in business services benefited, on the one hand, from a general increase of sectoral participation 
in manufacturing value chains – ICT services in particular –, and, on the other hand, from a stagnant labour 
productivity in professional and technical activities, and administrative and support services. 
Table 8: EU employment in 2000 and 2014 serving manufacturing value chains, thousands of people, by group and 
individual NACE sector of employment. Total change and shift due to 'participation effects - market shares', by 
destination of final demand. Based on WIOD. 
Thousands of people
EU final 
demand
ROW final 
demand
EU final 
demand
ROW final 
demand
Total Economic Activities 50,084 43,700 -10,443 4,058 -1,804 850
 Manufacturing 26,555 21,012 -6,885 1,342 -951 226
C-L Manufacturing - Low Tech 17,438 13,285 -4,795 642 -860 252
C-H Manufacturing - High Tech 9,117 7,726 -2,090 700 -91 -26
Non-Manufacturing
 Primary Activities 6,757 4,903 -2,147 293 38 389
A Agriculture 6,393 4,651 -2,030 288 113 396
B Mining 363 252 -117 6 -75 -7
 Utilities 533 570 -39 76 -6 18
D Electrictiy, Gas 288 249 -58 18 -10 4
E Water, Waste 244 321 19 58 3 15
 Logistic Services 8,537 8,075 -1,386 925 -327 263
G Trade 6,214 5,846 -1,094 725 -290 254
H Transport 2,323 2,230 -293 200 -37 9
 Business services 6,061 7,388 101 1,226 -511 -54
I Accommodation, Food 273 361 21 67 -10 5
J Information, Communication 634 679 -54 99 -55 -7
K Finance 750 743 -75 68 -50 -24
L Real Estate 108 116 -8 16 -4 2
M Professional, Technical 2,342 2,832 4 486 -249 -33
N Administrative, Support 1,954 2,657 214 489 -143 3
 Other Activities 1,642 1,752 -87 197 -47 7
F Construction 563 640 -13 90 -16 7
O Public Administration 278 329 5 46 -4 1
P Education 275 251 -46 22 -11 1
Q Health 81 103 9 13 0 5
R&S Personal Services 444 429 -41 25 -17 -6
EU employment 2000-2014 employment change
Total effects Mkt. Shares effect
2000 2014
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7 Conclusions 
The declining contribution of manufacturing to total GDP has led to concerns among policy makers in 
industrialized countries due to the widely assumed importance of this sector for productivity improvements, 
as well as for technological and exporting capacities. There are also concerns that the declining weight of 
manufacturing in the EU might reflect its declining competitiveness vis-à-vis China and other emerging 
economies. This article has presented a comprehensive study of the trends and drivers behind the decline of 
the EU manufacturing sector, both with a view on its weight within the EU's total economy, and in terms of its 
share within global manufacturing. 
In our first finding we highlight that the declining weight of manufacturing in Europe is likely exaggerated due 
to the use of nominal statistics. Using deflated data, we show that between 2000 and 2014 the 
manufacturing share of the EU economy has been almost flat, except for a slump during the crisis. In 
addition, dynamics have been quite heterogeneous across EU manufacturing activities. For instance, the 
relative cheapening of electronics accounts for half of the difference between nominal and deflated 
manufacturing weights, whereas its price-adjusted share shows the largest growth (in opposition to the sharp 
decline in the textile industry). 
Second, we developed a formal decomposition analysis applied to global input-output data, by which it was 
possible to formalize and quantify competitiveness as 'participation in value chains', and to decompose any 
change of value-added as a sum of contributions from various relevant drivers. Based on this, we find that 
whereas lower economic growth in the EU relative to the world has been detrimental for all manufacturing 
sectors, shifts in demand patterns – both for intermediate and final products – have exerted a negative 
(positive) impact for manufacturing activities with lower (higher) technological content. Moreover, the 
observed loss of global market shares (mainly to the benefit of China) is interpreted as declining 
competitiveness of EU manufacturing. This was most acute for textiles, electronics and electrical equipment, 
while pharmaceuticals came out as the only industry to show resilience under external competition. 
Third, in line with these overall trends, and similar to what can be observed for the US and Japan, also the 
share of the EU in global manufacturing value added has significantly decreased since 2000. Following the 
critique of the sector-based approach forwarded by Timmer et al. (2013) and Miroudot (2019), we have 
applied the decomposition both to the sector-based and final-demand definition of manufacturing, finding 
that demand effects are the main driver behind the EU's reduced global share, accounting or 62% and 73% 
of the total decline, respectively. It is worthwhile to note that sectoral and market share impacts are 
attenuated under the final-demand perspective, which is plausible under the EU's relative specialization on 
service inputs for manufacturing, which we uncovered in a short extension. 
In Table 9 we summarize the main quantitative results obtained for the aggregate manufacturing sector of 
the EU, showing the decomposition into informative drivers of the 2000-2014 change under both approaches: 
the value added and the value chain perspectives. 
Table 9: Summary of main quantitative results. 
However, at the level of individual manufacturing sectors the picture is rather idiosyncratic. For example, one 
technological trend with strong repercussions in our empirical analysis is the increased importance of 
electronics in manufacturing value chains. Due to this pull effect ('sectoral participation' in our terminology), 
the EU electronics sector increased its share in the EU's total economy and it also helped to sustain the EU's 
global manufacturing value-added share. However, the EU did not reap the same benefits from the rise of 
this sector as its competitors US and Japan, because of a concomitant loss of market shares, which 
essentially neutralized the positive impulse. The loss of market shares becomes even more pronounced when 
Volume Comp. Sectoral
Market 
shares
Volume Comp. Sectoral
Market 
shares
Weight in EU 
total economy
-1.1 1.0 -1.0 -0.2 -0.8 -1.4 1.3 -1.4 0.0 -1.3
Weight in 
global 
manufacturing
-9.0 -4.4 -1.2 -1.7 -1.6 -8.4 -4.3 -1.8 0.0 -2.3
Demand effects Demand effects2000-2014 change 
(percentage 
points)
Value Added perspective Value Chain perspective
Total 
change
Participation 
effects Total 
change
Participation 
effects
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looking at final demand for electronics, which inflicted a loss of global value-added share for this product 
class upon the EU, again larger than that of US or Japan.             
In view of this evidence and the sector's pivotal technological role, our results suggest that policy concerns in 
the EU should focus on the electronics sector. Electronics has been the most affected manufacturing activity 
by EU losses in global market shares. As opposed to the similarly affected textile sector, for which 
competitiveness losses would be a more natural trend in face of competition by low-wage emerging 
economies, a persistent negative trend for electronics could eventually harm innovation capacities and erode 
productivity growth. The latter will strongly depend on whether the competiveness losses in electronics 
manufacturing can been compensated elsewhere in the production chain by services with high technological 
content, such as scientific R&D, software development or IT services.(22)   
Finally, as a caveat to our objective of presenting a rigorous analysis of the global drivers of the EU's 
manufacturing performance, let us recall the limitations of the current statistical approach in national 
accounts mentioned by Miroudot (2019), who rightfully pointed out that these imperfections also affect the 
WIOD input output data used in this (and in his) study. We fully subscribe to his suggestion that in view of the 
simplifications applied in sector classifications, the presence of bundled manufacturing with service products, 
the use of in-house services by manufacturing companies, and the difficulty of deriving consistent sectoral 
price deflators, analyses of the manufacturing share in GDP or employment should always be taken with 
great caution. 
                                           
(22)  Galindo-Rueda and Verger (2016) update the OECD taxonomy of economic activities based on technological intensity to include 
services. 
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Annex 
Annex 1. Economic activities in WIOD, 2016 Release 
NACE code Name of economic activity
A01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities
A02 Forestry and logging
A03 Fishing and aquaculture
B Mining and quarrying
C10-C12 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products
C13-C15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products
C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
C24 Manufacture of basic metals
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
C31_C32 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
D35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
E36 Water collection, treatment and supply
E37-E39 Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery; remediation activities and other waste management services 
F Construction
G45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
G46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
G47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
H49 Land transport and transport via pipelines
H50 Water transport
H51 Air transport
H52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation
H53 Postal and courier activities
I Accommodation and food service activities
J58 Publishing activities
J59_J60 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities; programming and broadcasting activities
J61 Telecommunications
J62_J63 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; information service activities
K64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding
K65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
K66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities
L68 Real estate activities
M69_M70 Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; management consultancy activities
M71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
M72 Scientific research and development
M73 Advertising and market research
M74_M75 Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities
N Administrative and support service activities
O84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
P85 Education
Q Human health and social work activities
R_S Other service activities
T Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for own use
U Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies
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